@mr_clockwork91 said:
@nick_hero22 said:
@mr_clockwork91 said:
2. Why do I automatically rule out the possibility of external agents building in teleology in the evolutionary system? I don't. But my search for supernatural phenomenon leads me to believe that there is none. Especially in evolution.
3. Just disregard what I was saying, I was going off on a tangent in my head and was just thought typing. lol But back to my two questions.
If the premise of naturalism is true, what is the point of arguing it?
If naturalism is about beliefs attempting to obtain the best way to survive, wouldn't beliefs in theism or eternal life be the best belief? This is contradicting to naturalism.
And in regards in your post to Will, you stated "Thoughts and ideas aren't physical things though, and thoughts have the capacity to influence physical things (humans) to achieve certain results like justice, peace, love, hope, and etc. in the same sense that natural laws can influence the behavior of matter and energy."
Is it possible that thoughts and ideas are both matter and abstract things?
Here is video that made me raise that question, he talks about it around the 8 minute mark.
2) How do you test for teleology since you said that your search yielded no warrant for the belief in teleology?
Science and observations. As well as trying to logically prove by using philosphy.
3) The premise of naturalism is true? Naturalism isn't claiming that it is true. Naturalism is simply the belief that only physical entities exist. This is a strawman because naturalism isn't saying anything about evolution in particular because there could be other possible naturalistic mechanism that contribute to the traits we see. What the video maker is saying is that evolution by natural selection and random mutation is concerned with survivability.
I never said that naturalism is true. The guy started his argument by saying that "if naturalism is true" which if it was, what would be the point in arguing it? It is a strawman, exactly what I said about the video. Naturalism doesn't say anything about evolution. But he argues if Naturalism is true everything the brain does is for survival, which is what evolution is.
4) I would say no in regards to thoughts and ideas being made of matter because if that is the case we should be able to reduce them down to specific biological components because there is no specific component in the brain where your thoughts can be directly traced to.
I agree, just wondering what your thoughts on it were.
2) Could you explain?
3) No, what is say is if evolution is true then that undermines the belief that Naturalism is true since evolution is concerned with survivability and not truth.
4) Okay
@willpayton said:
@nick_hero22 said:
Thoughts and ideas aren't physical things though, and thoughts have the capacity to influence physical things (humans) to achieve certain results like justice, peace, love, hope, and etc. in the same sense that natural laws can influence the behavior of matter and energy.
It is irrelevant whether or not what we see is consistent with itself because that is not the question. The question is are our senses consistent with the truth, so you are dodging the question.
You are confused right now! Something being logical consistent with itself doesn't mean that it is true though. Natural Selection at the most only needs to provide us with cognitive faculties that can understand logic since understanding logic is necessary for problem solving; and humans excel at problem solving, but the problems we are solving doesn't necessarily have to correspond to some fundamental truth.
Sorry for the late reply. CV has not been consistently giving me notifications about posts where I'm tagged.
Thoughts and ideas are indeed physical things because they are simply states of the brain. There is no such thing as a thought or idea outside the context of a physical brain. So, still, I havent seen an example of a non-physical factor that influences how people experience things.
If the question is whether our senses are consistent with the truth then the only way we have to know is by testing what those senses tell us. So, not irrelevant at all.
Yes, I agree that because a set of ideas are consistent with each other doesnt make them true. But, the point is that this is the only way we have to judge truth. If your only way to know something is true is to exclude all experience and observation and only rely on your thoughts, then sadly that's not going to help you much. There's quite a lot of crazy people to prove that thoughts alone are not a reliable way to know anything.
I don't agree with this because if this was true then we should be able scan someone's brain and essentially read their mind since thoughts and ideas are reproducible to certain biochemical arrangements. Then there is the fact that thinking about something can affect my brain states such as thinking about the time I spent with my grandmother when I was a child which makes me happy, but then this give rises to the chicken and the egg problem because which one came first? My thoughts influencing my brain states, or my brain states influencing my thoughts?
What you are advocating for is called Eliminative materialism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism
Arguments against eliminativism[edit]
Intuitive reservations[edit]
The thesis of eliminativism seems to be so obviously wrong to many critics, under the claim that people know immediately and indubitably that they have minds, that argumentation seems unnecessary. This sort of intuition pumping is illustrated by asking what happens when one asks oneself honestly if one has mental states.[34] Eliminativists object to such a rebuttal of their position by claiming that intuitions often are mistaken. Analogies from the history of science are frequently invoked to buttress this observation: it may appear obvious that the sun travels around the earth, for example, but for all its apparent obviousness this conception was proved wrong nevertheless. Similarly, it may appear obvious that apart from neural events there are also mental conditions. Nevertheless, this could equally turn out to be false.[19]
But even if one accepts the susceptibility to error of people's intuitions, the objection can be reformulated: if the existence of mental conditions seems perfectly obvious and is central in people's conception of the world, then enormously strong arguments are needed in order to successfully deny the existence of mental conditions. Furthermore these arguments, to be consistent, need to be formulated in a way which does not pre-suppose the existence of entities like "mental states", "logical arguments", and "ideas", otherwise they are self-contradictory.[35] Those who accept this objection say that the arguments in favor of eliminativism are far too weak to establish such a radical claim; therefore there is no reason to believe in eliminativism.[34]
Self-refutation[edit]
Some philosophers, such as Paul Boghossian, have attempted to show that eliminativism is in some sense self-refuting, since the theory itself presupposes the existence of mental phenomena. If eliminativism is true, then the eliminativist must permit an intentionalproperty like truth, supposing that in order to assert something one must believe it. Hence, for eliminativism to be asserted as a thesis, the eliminativist must believe that it is true; if that is the case, then there are beliefs and the eliminativist claim is false.[11][36]
Georges Rey and Michael Devitt reply to this objection by invoking deflationary semantic theories that avoid analysing predicates like "x is true" as expressing a real property. They are construed, instead, as logical devices so that asserting that a sentence is true is just a quoted way of asserting the sentence itself. To say, "'God exists' is true" is just to say, "God exists". This way, Rey and Devitt argue, insofar as dispositional replacements of "claims" and deflationary accounts of "true" are coherent, eliminativism is not self-refuting.[37]
Another problem for the eliminativist is the consideration that human beings undergo subjective experiences and, hence, their conscious mental states have qualia. Since qualia are generally regarded as characteristics of mental states, their existence does not seem to be compatible with eliminativism.[38] Eliminativists, such as Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey, respond by rejecting qualia.[39][40] This is seen to be problematic to opponents of eliminativists, since many claim that the existence of qualia seems perfectly obvious. Many philosophers consider the "elimination" of qualia implausible, if not incomprehensible. They assert that, for instance, the existence of pain is simply beyond denial.[38]
The classic refutation of this objection comes from Daniel Dennett. Admitting that the existence of qualia seems obvious, Dennett nevertheless states that "qualia" is a theoretical term from an outdated metaphysics stemming from Cartesian intuitions. He argues that a precise analysis shows that the term is in the long run empty and full of contradictions. The eliminativist's claim with respect to qualia is that there is no unbiased evidence for such experiences when regarded as something more than propositional attitudes.[21]Influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Dennett and Rey have defended eliminativism about qualia, even when other portions of the mental are accepted.
Efficacy of folk psychology[edit]
Some philosophers simply argue that folk-psychology is a quite successful theory.[10][41][42] Simulation theorists doubt that people's understanding of the mental can be explained in terms of a theory at all. Rather they argue that people's understanding of others is based on internal simulations of how they would act and respond in similar situations.[8][9]Jerry Fodor is one of the objectors that believes in folk psychology's success as a theory, because it makes for an effective way of communication in everyday life that can be implemented with few words. Such an effectiveness could never be achieved with a complex neuroscientific terminology. [10]
Unjustified imperialism[edit]
Philosophers such as Mary Midgley strongly criticize all forms of reductionism—of which eliminative materialism is an extreme form—as unjustified imperialism that tries to annex one subject into another with poor evidence. She suggests that the reduction of chemistry to physics is problematic and the reduction of biology to chemistry is impossible. She points to sentences like "John was allowed home from prison at last on Sunday" suggesting that this would be impossible to reduce to physical terms since the details of the physical movement are irrelevant to the meaning which depends on complex non-physical concepts.[43] Her stance is that "human beings are complex wholes, about which we know really very little" and that attempts to reduce this are naive, unjustified and doomed to failure. She also claims that Behaviourism proved to be a philosophical and scientific dead-end.[43]
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